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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
institutional discrimination and that, as the Court proclaimed in
Grace, "the conciliation process of Title VII and the collective bar-
gaining process [would] complement each other, rather than con-
ffict.,, 48
2. Union Liability in Fair Representation Suits. - In a suit
initiated by an aggrieved employee charging her employer with wrong-
ful discharge and her union with a breach of its duty of fair repre-
sentation, a court confronts the issue whether and how liability should
be apportioned between the union and the employer. Because the
fear of adverse damage awards is an important determinant of the
parties' behavior within the grievance structure, the manner of ap-
portioning liability in such "hybrid" 1 cases has potentially far-reaching
consequences for the integrity of the grievance process. Lower courts
have generally resolved the troublesome question of apportionment by
holding employers solely liable for backpay - the largest portion of
the damages - and unions liable only for court costs and attorneys'
fees. 2 Last Term, however, in Bowen v. United States Postal Ser-
vice,3 the Supreme Court squarely held that a union may be found
liable for the portion of backpay damages attributable to its wrongful
refusal to arbitrate grievances.
Charles Bowen, a United States Postal Service employee, was
discharged in 1976 after an altercation with a fellow employee. He
subsequently filed a grievance with his union, the American Postal
Workers Union, AFL-CIO, which processed the grievance through
three of the four steps of its grievance procedure but declined to take
the grievance to arbitration. 4 Upon the union's dismissal of his griev-
ance, Bowen filed suit in federal district court against the union and
the employer. The court entered judgment for Bowen against both
defendants on the basis of an advisory jury's verdict that the Postal
Service had violated the collective bargaining agreement by discharg-
ing Bowen without just cause and that the union had violated its duty
of fair representation by handling his grievance in "an arbitrary and
perfunctory manner." Finding that Bowen would have been rein-
48 103 S. Ct. at 2186.
1 In a hybrid suit, the aggrieved employee sues both the union and the employer. The
employer is charged with violating the collective agreement under § 30! of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (Supp. V x981); the union is charged with violating its
duty of fair representation (first articulated by the Supreme Court in Steele v. Louisville &
N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944)) by failing to pursue the employee's grievance properly.
2 See infra notes 1o & 17.
3 1O3 S. Ct. 588 (1983).
4 See id. at 59o-91; Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 642 F.2d 79, 84 (4th Cir. 1981)
(Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
5 Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 47o F. Supp. 1127, 1129 (W.D. Va. 1979).
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stated but for the union's failure to take his grievance to arbitration, 6
the court ordered the defendants to reimburse Bowen in the amount
of $52,954 for lost benefits and wages. Apportioning the award be-
tween the union and the employer by estimating the date on which
Bowen would have been reinstated had the union taken his grievance
to arbitration, the court further ordered that $30,000 of the award be
paid by the union and $22,954 by the employer. 7 On appeal by both
defendants, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the
district court's factual findings, but overturned the damage award
against the union. The court of appeals held as a matter of law that
no part of the backpay could be charged against the union because
"Bowen's compensation was at all times payable only by the Service." 8
The Supreme Court reviewed the Fourth Circuit's decision against
the background of Vaca v. Sipes,9 the landmark fair representation
case in which the Court, more than fifteen years previously, had
addressed the issue of apportionment. Although the facts of Vaca
strongly suggest that the Court had intended to insulate the union
entirely from backpay liability,10 ambiguous language in the majority
opinion left room for a reading under which the union could be
ordered to assume a portion of that liability." In Bowen, over a
sharp dissent by Vaca's author, 12 the Court read Vaca to authorize
backpay awards against unions.
Although both the majority and the dissent in Bowen discussed
Vaca at length, the Bowen opinions were grounded primarily on policy
considerations. In fact, although arguing for sharply differing results,
both sides drew upon the same concerns: fairness, the role of contract
doctrine in the collective bargaining system, and the health of the
6 Id.
7 Id. at 1131.
8 Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 642 F.2d 79, 82 (4 th Cir. i98I).
9 386 U.S. 171, 197 (1967).
10 See 103 S. Ct. at 6o-2 (White, J., dissenting in relevant part). But see 103 S. Ct. at
596 n.13 (arguing that the account of the facts in Vaca was "not sufficiently clear" to allow the
Court to determine in retrospect the portion of damages attributable to each party).
Courts of appeals construing Vaca and its Supreme Court progeny have generally interpreted
Vaca to prohibit union liability for backpay. See id. at 593 n.8, 599 n.i. The majority and
the dissent sharply disputed the consistency of the decisions by circuit courts after Vaca. Whereas
Justice Powell's majority opinion quoted dicta from several courts of appeals indicating the
possibility that unions could be liable for backpay damages, see id. at 593 n.8, Justice White's
dissent pointed out that no court of appeals had ever actually awarded backpay against a union
that had not affirmatively caused the wrongful discharge, see id. at 599 n. i (White, J., dissenting
in relevant part).
11 See Vaca, 386 U.S. at 197-98. Compare io3 S. Ct. at 593, 595-96 (arguing that Vaca's
language is consistent with backpay apportionment), with id. at 6o-o2 (White, J., dissenting
in relevant part) (arguing that Vaca's language, as amplified in Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 US. 25,
29 (1970), is consistent with a rule against apportionment).
12 See io3 S. Ct. at 600-02 (White, J., dissenting in relevant part).
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grievance process. Justice Powell, writing for the majority,13 asserted
that considerations of fairness dictated that the union be liable for
backpay accruing after the hypothetical arbitration date. He empha-
sized that it would be "unjust to require the employer to bear the
increase in the damages caused by the union's wrongful conduct."' 14
In dissent,' 5 Justice White countered that damages on the order of
those assessed against the union in Bowen were far out of proportion
to the union's comparative culpability; the union should not be held
liable for backpay damages greater than those awarded against the
employer, given that the employer remains a "but for" cause of all
such damages. 16
With regard to the role of contract doctrine in fair representation
suits, Justice White's dissent argued that the employer should be held
exclusively liable for backpay according to "the traditional rule of
contract law that a breaching defendant must pay damages equivalent
to the total harm suffered." 17 Justice Powell responded that such a
simple contractual analysis ignores the complex "relationships and
interests" created by the collective bargaining system. 18 Under collec-
tive bargaining agreements containing arbitration clauses, 19 unions
play a "pivotal role" in the grievance process because of their generally
exclusive right to initiate grievances, and they have a duty to exercise
13 Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan, Stevens, and O'Connor joined in the majority
opinion.
14 103 S. Ct. at 595 (footnote omitted). Although the Postal Workers Union was held liable
for all post-arbitration-date backpay in Bowen, the majority indicated that its holding did not
require such a result. The majority observed in a footnote that "the union would have the
option, if it realized [after the arbitration deadline passed that] it had committed an arguable
breach of duty, to bring its default to the employer's attention. Our holding today would not
prevent a jury from taking such action into account." Id. at 597 n.15. This rule, which at
first appears to provide unions with a ready means of limiting Bowen liability, is nevertheless
unlikely to reduce significantly the incentives that Bowen gives unions to arbitrate additional
grievances. The union would remain liable for backpay accruing between the arbitration
deadline and the union's notification to the employer of a newfound desire to arbitrate. More
importantly, a union could not be certain that a jury would take that notification into account
or, if the jury did, that it would absolve the union entirely of liability.
Is Justices Marshall and Blackmun joined in Justice White's dissent in its entirety. Justice
Rehnquist joined the portions of the dissent that dealt with the apportionment of backpay
liability between the union and the employer.
16 103 S. Ct. at 603-04 (,Vhite, J., dissenting in relevant part).
17 Id. at 603. Justice White stated that, when the union does not affirmatively induce the
employer to commit the wrongful discharge, the union is liable only for attorneys' fees, court
costs, and other such damages "to the extent that its misconduct 'add[s] to the difficulty and
expense of collecting from the employer."' Id. at 602 (quoting Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25,
29 (1970)).
Is 1o3 S. Ct. at 593-94.
19 Approximately 97% of all collective bargaining agreements contain such provisions. See,
e.g., 2 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS (BNA) No. 99o, at 51:5 (May
12, 1983) (sample of 400 agreements in various industries).
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that right responsibly. 20 Although Justice Powell conceded that unions
owe this duty of fair representation primarily to individual employees,
he asserted that the employer should be able to rely on a union's
decision not to pursue an employee's grievance. 2 ' Justice White, how-
ever, argued that in fashioning such a reliance interest, the majority
had violated the Court's longstanding rule against reading implied
terms into the collective bargaining agreement. 2 2 The employer that
wishes to be indemnified against backpay liability, according to Justice
White, should have to bargain with the union for such protection.
Justice Powell further claimed that apportionment of damages is
essential to effectuating the national labor policy of ensuring that the
grievance procedure provides the "uniform and exclusive method for
[the] orderly settlement of employee grievances." 23 Placing total back-
pay liability on employers, Justice Powell argued, not only would
weaken unions' incentives to comply with the grievance procedure,
but also might reduce employers' willingness to enter into arbitration
clauses as they are customarily written. 24 In reply, Justice White
pointed out that the majority's rule may make unions unwilling to
enter into the typical arbitration clause.2 5 More importantly, Justice
White argued, the majority's rule, ostensibly designed to protect the
grievance process, may actually "impairf the ability of the grievance
machinery to provide for orderly dispute resolution" by causing unions
to take many unmeritorious grievances to arbitration in order to avoid
backpay liability for breach of duty.2 6 Unions need no additional
incentive to process valid grievances, according to Justice White,
because adequate incentives are already provided by the potentially
substantial fees and costs for which unions have long been liable in
fair representation cases.
2 7
As the dissent recognized, the Court's decision in Bowen does more
than merely apportion damages: it threatens the integrity of the griev-
ance process by giving unions an incentive to congest arbitration
machinery with unmeritorious grievances. Such a result would not
only defeat the important national labor policy of settling grievances
before arbitration,2 8 but would also jeopardize the efficiency of the
arbitration process itself and render grievance negotiation a futile and
perhaps even counterproductive activity. Thus, although the majority
20 1o3 S. Ct. at 596-97.
21 Id. at 597.
22 Id. at 604-05 (White, J., dissenting in relevant part).
23 103 S. Ct. at 597 (quoting Clayton v. International Union, United Auto., Aerospace &
Agric. Implement Workers, 451 U.S. 679, 686 (g8i)).
24 Id.
2s Id. at 605.
26 Id. The majority opinion failed to acknowledge this threat.
27 Id. at 602 n.6.
28 See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. I7M, 191 (1967).
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emphasized the "fundamental" importance of the grievance pr6cedure
to federal labor policy,2 9 the Court's new approach may serve more
to undermine than to strengthen the grievance process.
The incentives for unions to overload the arbitration machinery
derive less from the mere possibility of backpay liability than from
the unpredictability of the juries that often determine this liability.30
Unions fear that juries, out of antiunion animus, sympathy for un-
employed grievants, or simply ignorance of the realities of labor re-
lations, may find breaches of duty in cases in which unions' refusals
to arbitrate are based on valid considerations. 3 1 Even unbiased juries
may erroneously find unions liable in hybrid suits because of the
difficulty of separating contract claims from fair representation claims.
In theory, juries are required to base their fair representation decisions
on assessments of the reasonableness or good faith of union actions
and not on independent judgments of the merits of a grievance. 32 In
practice, however, it is difficult for a jury to distinguish the two
inquiries. 33 Fear of unpredictable jury verdicts caused unions to send
some unmeritorious claims to arbitration even before Bowen,3 4 but
29 103 S. Ct. at 596-97.
30 Although fair representation cases are frequently tried to juries, the right to a jury trial
in such cases has not been firmly established. Compare Rowan v. Howard Sober, Inc., 384 F.
Supp. 1121, 1125 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (fair representation issues are triable to a jury), with
Acheson v. Bottlers Local 896, 83 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2845, 2846 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (no right to
jury trial because of equitable nature of fair representation claims), aff'd on other grounds sub.
nona. Acheson v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 523 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1975). See generally 2 THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 13o6-07 (C. Morris 2d ed. 1983) (citing cases that conflict on jury
right). The influence of juries in fair representation cases actually extends beyond the boundaries
of any jury right, because juries are sometimes used in an advisory capacity even when the
parties have no jury right. In Bowen itself, the district court employed an advisory jury and
adopted its findings and verdict in every respect. See supra p. 278.
31 In Vaca, for example, the jury found that the union had acted "arbitrarily, capriciously,
and without just or reasonable reason or cause" in refusing to arbitrate a grievance for a health-
related discharge, even though the union based its decision on the opinion of a medical specialist
- chosen by the employee - that the employee was not only unfit for work, but also ill enough
to qualify for total Social Security disability benefits. See Feller, A General Theory of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 663, 701 (1973). Although the Supreme
Court ultimately overturned the jury's verdict, see Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, x88-89 (1967),
that verdict remains significant as an example of a jury's harsh assessment of apparently
reasonable union action.
32 See Vaca, 386 U.S. at 192-93. A union is justified in dismissing a grievance that is later
found meritorious if the union believes in good faith that the grievant has only a slight chance
of prevailing in arbitration. See, e.g., Buchanan v. NLRB, 597 F.2d 388, 394-95 (4th Cir.
1979); Shadday v. International Harvester, 112 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3439, 3441-42 (S.D. Ind.
1983).
33 See Feller, supra note 31, at 815. In Bowen itself, the employee based his case primarily
upon a controversial expert witness whose opinion that the union had breached its duty was
apparently founded in part on her view of the merits of the employee's claim. See Bowen v.
United States Postal Serv., 642 F.2d 79, 82 (4th Cir. i98i); id. at 84 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
34 Cf. Asher, Comment, 27 NAT'L ACAD. ARB. PROC. 31, 36-37 (1975) (stating that fear of
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the pressure to do so has greatly increased now that juries can award
much larger verdicts against unions. 35
Serious harm to the grievance process may result if unions do feel
compelled to push unmeritorious grievances to arbitration. Increases
in the number of claims and in the "legalization" of the arbitration
process have already added to the cost and length of grievance arbi-
tration; 36 the Bowen decision may exacerbate the problem. More
importantly, the frame of reference for grievance negotiations is sup-
posed to be the anticipated judgment of arbitrators. The ability to
predict arbitral decisions with some certainty - an ability founded
on common knowledge of arbitrators and the "law of the shop" 37 -
allows parties to fulfill the important policy of settling grievances at
early stages of the grievance process. That ability has now been
severely hampered. Unions may often be unwilling to settle early,
because employers' arguments that particular grievances have no
chance of success in arbitration will carry little weight in comparison
with union fears that juries will find merit in apparently frivolous
claims. Moreover, because they may feel compelled to claim that all
grievances are meritorious in order to ward off the threat of Bowen
liability,38 unions will lose credibility with employers and arbitrators
alike, and in doing so they may well prejudice even valid claims.
Because neither the majority nor the dissent acknowledged the
serious problem that the jury poses in fair representation suits, neither
opinion considered alternative solutions that might have deemphasized
the jury's role without compromising major policy concerns. Under
one such alternative approach - which Bowen neither examined nor
foreclosed - a court would endeavor to lessen the jury threat by
limiting the employee's remedy against the union to an order compel-
courts' disposition of unfair representation claims caused unions to press unmeritorious grievances
to arbitration); Rubenstein, Comment, 32 NAT'L ACAD. ARB. PROC. 47 (198o) (same).
35 The uncertainty created by juries is exacerbated by the Court's failure to articulate a clear
standard of union liability in fair representation cases. The Court has not considered the
standard of liability since Vaca, in which it stated that a grievant must prove that the union's
conduct is "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith." 386 U.S. at 19o. The courts of appeals
have differed in their interpretations of the standard. Compare Dober v. Roadway Express,
Inc., 707 F.2d 292, 294 (7th Cir. 1983) (breach of duty requires "intentional misconduct" by
union), with Robesky v. Qantas Empire Airways Ltd., 573 F.2d io82, i088-9o (9th Cir. 1978)
(unintentional acts or omissions may constitute breach of union's duty). See generally 2 THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 30, at 1322-25 (describing various standards applied in
courts of appeals).
36 See, e.g., Bowers, Seeber & Stallworth, Grievance Mediation: A Route to Resolution for
the Cost-Conscious 1980s, 33 LAB. L.J. 459, 459 (1982); Goldberg, The Mediation of Grievances
Under a Collective Bargaining Contract: An Alternative to Arbitration, 77 Nw. U.L. REV. 270,
274-75 (1982).
37 See Cox, Reflections upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1512 (1959).
38 The duty of fair representation requires the union not only to press valid grievances to
arbitration, but also to represent the grievant fairly throughout arbitration. See, e.g., Miller v.
Gateway Transp. Co., 66 F.2d 272, 276-77 (7th Cir. I98O).
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ling arbitration of the contract claim. After a jury verdict that the
union violated its duty of fair representation, the court would order
arbitration rather than immediately give force 'to the jury's backpay
apportionment. The court would enter judgment on the jury's back-
pay verdict only if an arbitrator subsequently found the contract claim
meritorious. 39 This solution, which has been advocated by at least
one prominent labor commentator 40 and considered by the Court,4 1
would require unions to bear backpay liability in appropriate situa-
tions without remitting the determination of the merits of particular
grievances to the vagaries of the jury room. 42 Unions would not fear
dismissing unmeritorious claims if they could rely on determinations
by knowledgeable arbitrators. The likelihood that the grievance ma-
chinery would become congested would therefore be substantially re-
duced.
Although the congestion problem looms as one of the principal
dangers of the Bowen decision, the considerable costs of arbitration
provide unions with an incentive to prevent an increase in the number
of cases arbitrated. 43 Thus, unions will doubtless develop strategies
in response to Bowen that will both insulate them to the greatest
possible extent from liability and at the same time alleviate the pres-
sure to send a large number of unmeritorious cases mechanically to
arbitration. To this end, unions are likely to explore possibilities of
altering their internal grievance procedures or establishing grievance
mediation programs. 44
39 One problem with such a solution is that unions might inadequately represent the grievant
in the ensuing arbitration. That problem would disappear, however, if the grievant were
permitted to provide her own counsel for arbitration. See Feller, supra note 31, at 8x6.
40 See id. at 813-17.
41 See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 196 (1967). Although Justice White recognized in Vaca
that an order compelling arbitration is an available remedy in fair representation cases, he
stated that there is no reason "inflexibly to require arbitration in all cases," because an arbitrator
may have no power under the bargaining agreement to award damages against the union and
because the arbitrable issues "may be substantially resolved in the course of trying the fair
representation controversy." Id. Neither of these arguments seems persuasive in light of Bowen.
First, unions would probably be happy to grant arbitrators the power to award damages against
the union if that concession would take such power out of the hands of juries. Second, the
efficiency rationale advanced by Justice White is now counterbalanced by the threat that Bowen
poses to the health of the grievance process.
42 Because juries would be unable to assess backpay damages without the concurrence of
an arbitrator, unions would have little reason to fear unreasonable jury verdicts.
43 This argument assumes that unions would continue to bear all arbitration costs for their
employees. In response to Bowen, a union might sacrifice its exclusive right to initiate arbitration
and might seek a collective bargaining term that would grant employees the right to press
discharge grievances to arbitration regardless of the union's assessment of the merits, Cf. P.
WEILER, RECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES 137-39 (ig8o) (advocating such a system on fairness
grounds). Employees pressing claims the union considered unmeritorious might be required to
bear their own arbitration costs.
44 Alternatively, the union could bargain for a clause requiring backpay indemnification from
the employer.
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One novel grievance procedure that mitigates the problems posed
by Bowen is the United Auto Workers' system of internal appeals that
an aggrieved employee must normally exhaust before she may file a
lawsuit. 45 The grievant may appeal the dismissal of her grievance
either to a rank-and-file appeals committee or to the United Auto
Workers' Public Review Board. 46 If either body finds that the griev-
ance was dismissed improperly, it may award relief against the union,
including backpay and, in some cases, reinstatement of the griev-
ance. 47 These backpay awards pose a much smaller threat to the
union than do court-imposed damage awards, because the internal
appeals are decided by experts or union members rather than juries.
Under a system such as the UAW's, grievants unsuccessful in their
internal appeals might still file fair representation suits, but many
probably would hesitate to do so once a fair hearing before their peers
or an impartial body48 had established that their claims lacked merit.
Further, those who filed suits would generally be unsuccessful, because
courts have usually considered this elaborate appeals process to be a
fair and reasonable means of handling grievances. 49 As a result, the
internal appeals process would reduce the costs stemming from the
threat of Bowen liability.
Nonbinding grievance mediation, which has been proposed as a
solution to the "overlegalization" of arbitration, 50 might also insulate
unions from the ramifications of Bowen liability. Grievants who
agreed to mediated settlements would be barred from later filing
hybrid suits.5 ' Grievants unable or unwilling to settle would be given
45 See, e.g., Willetts v. Ford Motor Co., 583 F.2d 852, 855-57 (6th Cir. 1978); Gomez v.
International Union, UAW, 1o9 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3356, 3358 (E.D. Mich. 1981); INTERNA-
TIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS
OF AMERICA CONST. art. 33, § 5 [hereinafter cited as UAW CONSTITUTION]. But see Clayton
v. International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers, 451 U.S. 679,
693-95 (i98i) (holding that some employees are not required to exhaust UAW internal appeals
when internal remedies would be insufficient to redress their specific complaints).
46 See Clayton, 451 U.S. at 682-83; UAW CONSTITUTION, supra note 45, art. 33, §§ 1-2.
47 See Clayton, 451 U.S. at 69o; Gomez v. International Union, UAW, io9 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
3356, 3358 (E.D. Mich. x981).
48 Courts regard the UAW's Public Review Board as an independent and impartial body.
See, e.g., Payne v. Ford Motor Co., rio L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2428, 2430 (N.D. Ohio 1982); Rios
v. International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers, 98 Lab. Cas.
(CCH) 10,308, at 18,548 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
49 See, e.g., Pickens v. Quaker Oats Co., io8 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3o96, 3097 (N.D. Ohio
i98i); Coleman v. General Motors Corp., 504 F. Supp. goo, 906-07 (E.D. Mo. I98O), aff'd,
667 F.2d 704 (8th Cir. 1982). But see Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 641 F.2d 1075, io82
(2d Cir. 198i) (holding UAW internal appeals procedures not reasonable as a matter of law).
50 See Bowers, Seeber & Stallworth, supra note 36; Goldberg, supra note 36. Mediation is
speedier and less expensive than arbitration. See Bowers, Seeber & Stallworth, supra note 36,
at 463; Goldberg, supra note 36, at 281.
51 If the agreement were acceptable to the employee, one of its terms would be a waiver of
the right to sue.
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the mediator's judgment about the likely outcome in arbitration. 52
Although it would not be binding, a neutral mediator's opinion that
a grievance lacked merit would nevertheless discourage many griev-
ants from further pressing their claims through arbitration or a
lawsuit 53 and would provide the union with a defense for not pursuing
the grievance further. 54 Thus, mediation would reduce not only the
number of lengthy, expensive arbitrations, but also the number of fair
representation suits and the proportion of such suits that result in
judgments against the union.
Despite its expression of concern for the grievance process, then,
the Bowen decision poses a serious threat to the grievance machinery
as well as to the financial health of unions. Because the Court failed
to minimize the role of juries in fair representation suits, unions must
now devise strategies to reduce both the number of lawsuits and the
number of adverse judgments in the suits that are filed. The creativity
of unions' response to Bowen will determine whether the decision's
feared effect on union treasuries and on the grievance procedure will
in fact materialize.
E. Securities Law
Insider Trading. - Last Term, in Dirks v. SEC,I the Supreme
Court established a new test for determining the liability of persons
who engage in securities transactions on the basis of "tips" from
corporate insiders. 2 The Court held that a tippee who trades on the
basis of a tip is liable under the federal securities laws only if: (I) his
tipper breached a fiduciary duty in making the tip, and (2) the tippee
knew or should have known of this breach. 3 Dirks attests that the
Court's handling of insider trading cases will invariably turn on a
fiduciary duty analysis.
The first definitive statement of the rationale for prohibiting trad-
ing by a tippee on the basis of inside information was provided by
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in Cady, Roberts &
Co.4 The SEC declared that an insider who tips or trades subverts a
relationship of trust by using information intended to be available
52 See Goldberg, supra note 36, at 281.
53 Because of the considerable cost of defending fair representation suits, unions have a
strong interest in preventing the filing of suits that is independent of their interest in preventing
adverse judgments.
54 See Goldberg, supa note 36, at 286-87.
1 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
2 Throughout this Case Comment, the term "insider trading" will be used to refer to
transactions based upon nonpublic material information acquired from an insider.
3 103 S. Ct. at 3264.
4 40 S.E.C. 907 (x961).
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